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Environmental Law as a
Field of Multi-Polar
Governance: The Case of
Private Transnational
Environmental
Regulation
Oren Perez

Daniel Bodansky’s The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law is a valuable
scholarly work that offers the reader a journey into the complexities of contemporary
international environmental law. One of the advantages of writing a review that is part of a
dedicated volume is that I do not have to give an account of the whole book, but can focus on
those to which I have more to say, hoping that the other contributors to this volume will fill
the gap.
The book carves a unique path in international environmental law literature. First, it does
not seek to offer a comprehensive survey of international environmental law, but rather to
examine the "processes through which international environmental law is developed,
implemented, and enforced.”1 Second, the book was written with a stronger methodological
and philosophical outlook than is typical of introductory works. It is, in other words, a
theoretically motivated work.
My critique of the book highlights what, in my mind, is a significant blind-spot of the
book: the increasingly important role of private transnational environmental regulation
("PTER") in the contemporary field of global environmental governance. A book that is
seeking to unfold the dynamic of international environmental law should, I will argue, be
interested not only in the art and craft of treaty-making, but also in the craftsmanship of
rule-making as it takes place within global organizations such as the Global Reporting
Initiative, the International Organization for Standardization, the Forest Stewardship
Council ("FSC") and the Marine Stewardship Council. Further, as the universe of PTER is
1.

DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011).
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growing in both its influence and in its scale, studying the linkages between this universe and
the classic domain of public international law is becoming a critical policy question. What are
the potential synergies or dis-complementarities between the two domains? To what extent
normative developments within the PTER domain can support or facilitate normative
processes within the treaty domain (and vice-versa). Further, reflecting on the linkages
between these domains also requires us to deal directly with some of the theoretical questions
that lie at the core of the book, such as the meaning of law in the international realm, the
distinction between soft law and hard law, and the mechanisms of compliance.

I. Setting the Scene: The Emergence of Private Transnational
Environmental Regulation as a New Source of Global Ordering
Over the last several years, the environmental regulation system has undergone radical
changes. Various private normative schemes, including voluntary corporate codes,2
environmental management systems,3 “green label” schemes,4 environmental reporting
standards,5 green financial schemes and green indexes,6 have taken an increasingly
important role in the environmental regulatory field.7 The emergence of private
environmental schemes with global reach has changed the nature of the private governance
field. Once a field that was highly fragmented and consisted of uncoordinated organizational
routines and segregated contractual arrangements, PTER has turned into a much more
ordered domain, dominated by several centers of global governance. This change influenced
all the facets of the governance game — from the norm-production process to implementation
and enforcement. Further, these emerging regimes developed highly specified and articulated
legal schemes, supported by intricate institutional structures.8 As such, the new regimes

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
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See, e.g., OECD Guidelines of Multinational Enterprise, OECDILIBRARY (Sept. 29, 2011),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf.
For examples of management systems, see ISO 14001, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
available
at
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=31807;
EU
EMAS
Regulations,
No
1221/2009
of
Nov.
25,
2009,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R1221:EN:NOT;
&
Responsible Care program, available at http://www.icca-chem.org/en/Home/Responsible-care/.
For examples of “green label” schemes, see FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL UNITED STATES,
http://www.fscus.org/ (last visited May 20, 2012); & About Certification, ENERGY STAR,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=cbd_guidebook.cbd_guidebook_apply_3, (last visited May 20,
2012).
For examples of environmental reporting standards, see Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (GRI),
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, available at https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1Guidelines-Incl-Technical-Protocol.pdf; & AA1000 Assurance Standard, available at
http://www.accountability.org/standards/aa1000as/index.html.
Green financial schemes include codes regulating lending practices and “ethical” investment
standards. For examples of green indexes, see DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDEXES
http://www.sustainability-index.com/ (last visited May 20, 2012), & FTSE4Good Index Series, FTSE
INDEX COMPANY, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/index.jsp (last visited May
20, 2012).
Some of the foregoing instruments, such as the GRI, also cover non-environmental issues. There are
similar instruments covering other aspects of the corporate responsibility issue, such as the SA8000
standard, dealing with human rights of workers. Social Accountability 8000, SOCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL, (2008) http://www.sa-intl.org/.
Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private
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differ from some of the first-generation global codes, which lacked both the extensive
specificity and the intricate institutional fabric that characterize their second-generation
successors.9 The increasing importance of private environmental schemes can be linked to the
rise of regulatory capitalism as the predominant form of capitalism at the beginning of the
twenty-first century.10
It is beyond the scope of this brief paper to examine in detail these varied regimes. The
table below outlines some of the leading PTER schemes. As can be seen from the table, the
schemes differ in their style and scope. They include both general standards that seek to
regulate the rule-making process itself, meta-regulatory norms seeking to regulate
institutional processes at the firm level (e.g., environmental self-management, environmental
disclosure), and substantive standards that regulate specific environmental policy domains
(relating to production methods or product components).11 What is common to these
examples is that they all have an elaborated normative structure, supported by a developed
institutional framework.12

9.

10.

11.
12.

Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297 (2007); see also Benjamin
Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental Governance: How Non-State
Market-Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J.
POL’Y, ADMIN, INST. 503 (2002); see also Tim Buthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A
(P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL. 1 (2010).
Two good examples of first-generation codes are The Ceres Principles, CERES
http://www.ceres.org/about-us/our-history/ceres-principles (last visited May 21, 2012); Global
Sullivan
Principles,
THE
LEON
H.
SULLIVAN
FOUNDATION,
http://thesullivanfoundation.org/about/global-sullivan-principles.
David Lazer, Regulatory Capitalism as a Networked Order: The International System as an
Informational Network, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 52 (2005); John Braithwaite,
Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism, REGNET OCCASIONAL PAPER 5 (2005), available at
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/nontaxpubs/ROP5.pdf.
For a discussion of meta-regulation, see John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive
Regulation for Tax System Integrity, 25 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2003).
For further discussion of PTER schemes, see Klaus Dingwerth & Philipp Pattberg World Politics
and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance. 15 EUR. J. INT’L
REL. 707 (2009), available at http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/15/4.toc; see also Buthe, supra note 8.
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Table 1: The Universe of Global Private Environmental Ordering (Partial Picture)
Regulatory

Field of

The Legal

Responsible

Compliance

Category

Intervention

Instrument

Organization

Mechanisms

Metaregulation of

Transnational
Standard-

ISEAL Code of
Good

ISEAL Alliance

Independent Evaluation
Mechanism

standard
setting

Setting

Practice for
Setting Social

(http://www.isealalliance.
org/resources/p049-

and
Environmental

independent-evaluationmechanism-procedure)

Standards,
Vol. 5
Metaregulation of

Environmental
Management

corporate
governance

ISO 14001,
Responsible

International
Organization for

Private external
verification (relatively

Care

Standardization,
International

robust in the case of ISO
14001)

(Process
based

Council of
Chemical

intervention)

Associations
(ICCA),
Sustainability
Reporting

GRI
Guidelines

Global Reporting
Initiative

GRI (documents check),
Private External
Assurance (based on
global rules)

Assurance

ISAE 3000,

The International

Practices

AA1000
Assurance

Auditing and
Assurance

None

Standard

Standards Board;
AccountAbility

General CSR

Global

UN led

Transparency based

Guidelines

Compact

Green

Forest

Forest

Independent certification

Labeling
(product &

Stewardship
Council global

Stewardship
Council; Social

bodies accredited by the
Forest Stewardship

process
oriented)

label; SA8000
(social

Accountability
International;

Council; SAAS (in the
case of SA8000) and FLO-

accountability
standard);

FairTrade
International

CERT GmbH (in the case
of FairTrade

Specific
Intervention

288

FairTrade
International

International,
http://www.flo-cert.net/flo-

Standards

cert/)
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Sustainability
Indexes

FTSE4Good,
Dow Jones

FTSE, Dow Jones

Sustainability
Index ("DJSI")

Private compliance
governed by FTSE and
Dow Jones and drawing
on external consultants
(Eiris & SAM)

Environmental
Impact
Assessment

Equator
Principles13

Joint Governance
by Participating

Voluntary reporting
mechanism

Banks

(http://www.equatorprinciples.com/reporting.s
html)

II. Private Transnational Environmental Regulation ("PTER") as a
Reflexive Network
Over the past five years the PTER field has reached a turning point, which has
transformed it from a highly fragmented domain into a reflexive network that exhibits
increasing capacity for introspection, coordination and cross-regime synergy. Consider first,
the issue of reflexivity. A prerequisite for the emergence of such reflexivity is the
intensification of ties among the network elements (density).14 Indeed, within the PTER it is
possible to find multiple links and cross-sensitivities between the distinct regimes that are
part of the network. Thus, for example, The GRI Guidelines refer to external standards, by
requiring organizations to list all the external economic, environmental, and social codes to
which they subscribe, including any environment-related performance or certification
system.15 The FTSE4Good Inclusion Criteria state that high-impact companies with ISO or
EMAS certification are considered to meet several core indicators, which are required from
such companies; such firms are also subject to stricter disclosure requirements.16
The intensification of the ties between the network nods does not suffice, however, for the
emergence of network reflexivity. The communicative interaction between the network
elements has to take a dialogical form, which is not hierarchical. The idea of network
reflexivity refers, therefore, to reciprocal communicative processes through which the
elements of the network refer to each other in a way that involves complex epistemic and
normative judgement, and continuously challenges the network structure.17 Three prominent

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

There are close links between the Equator Principles and the GRI Financial Services Sector
Supplement. See OECD, supra note 2 (procedures for assessing and screening environmental and
social risks in business lines).
Following Marwell and Oliver, I define density as the number of actual social ties in a collective
divided by the number possible. See Gerald Marwell, Pamela E. Oliver, & Ralph Prahl, Social
Networks and Collective Action: A Theory of the Critical Mass. III., 94 AM. J. SOC. 502, 505 (1988).
Global Reporting Initiative, supra note 4, at 23, 27.
FTSE4Good Index Series Inclusion Criteria, at 3, FTSE INDEX COMPANY (2006), available at
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/Downloads/FTSE4Good_Inclusion_Criteria.p
df.
For example, in terms of the structure and weight of the links between the network elements and
the centrality of different elements within the structure see Alain Barrat et al., The Architecture of
Complex Weighted Networks, at 3747, PNAS, March 16, 2004, available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/101/11/3747.full.pdf+html; see also Steven H. Strogatz, Exploring
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examples for the emergence of this kind of reflexivity within the contemporary PTER field are
ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards (representing
an attempt to regulate the global standard-setting process), the International Standard ISO
26000:2010, Guidance on social responsibility (representing an attempt to develop an
international consensus on what social responsibility ("SR") means and the SR issues that
organizations need to address) and Accountability AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement
Standard (a general mechanism to achieve the stakeholder requirements of various global
standards, such as GRI, ISO 26000 and others).18 These three examples were not just the
culmination of a reflexive dialogue, but would also serve as the basis for continued reflexive
interaction within the network in the future.
Another feature of reflexive networks is the emergence of coordination dynamics. The
foregoing three standards also represent a form of emerging coordination. Another reflection
of the coordination dynamic in the PTER field is the emergence of structured sites for
conversation between network elements. Examples include joint forums such as the
European Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Corporate Social Responsibility chaired by the EU
Commission and the ISEAL Alliance and the UN Global Compact Network,19 long-term
contractual arrangements such as the Memorandum of Understanding between ISO and GRI
which was signed on September 2011,20 and the emergence of transnational associations such
as the International Business Leaders Forum (IBLF) and CSR Europe.21
A third feature of the emerging field of private environmental governance concerns its
ensemble regulatory structure.22 This ensemble structure characterizes, in particular, the
corporate social responsibility ("CSR") universe. By ensemble regulation, I refer to a collection
of autonomous regulatory schemes that form a regulatory network, clustering around a
common core of basic principles and exhibiting positive enforcement and normative
externalities. The notion of positive enforcement externalities refers to the way in which
compliance mechanisms of each regime also serve as an enforcement agent of the other

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.
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Complex Networks, NATURE, March 8, 2001, at 268.
See ISEAL Code of Good Practice, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/code (last visited
May 21, 2012); ISO 26000 – Social Responsibility, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_responsibility/sr
_iso26000_overview.htm (last visited May 21, 2012); AA1000 Stakeholder Engagement Standard,
ACCOUNTABILITY http://www.accountability.org/standards/aa1000ses/index.html (last visited May
21, 2012).
European
Multi-Stakeholder
Forum,
available
at
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/empl/csr_eu_multi_stakeholder_forum/info/data/en/csr%20ems%20forum.h
tm;
UN
Global
Compact
Participants,
UNITED
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html (last visited May 12,
2012).
ISO and Global Reporting Initiative Increase Cooperation on Sustainable Development, GLOBAL
REPORTING,
(Oct.
4,
2011),
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-presscenter/Pages/ISO-and-Global-Reporting-Initiative-increase-cooperation-on-sustainabledevelopment.aspx.
INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
LEADERS
FORUM,
http://www.iblf.org/;
CSR
EUROPE,
http://www.csreurope.org/.
See Oren Perez, Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble Regulation: A Critical Exploration
of Sustainability Indexes and the New Ensemble Politics, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 543
(2011).
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regimes in the network, generating an amplified compliance effect. The meaning of this effect
is that firms entering into the world of CSR are finding it increasingly more difficult to reap
the reputational gains associated with voluntary CSR codes without undertaking real
organizational efforts. Once a firm starts to publish environmental reports drawing on the
GRI guidelines, adopts a certified EMS (ISO 14001 or Responsible Care), and enters the
reputable list of either FTSE4Good or DJSI, it becomes increasingly more difficult for this
firm to renege on its multidimensional commitments. Therefore, ensemble regulation makes
it much more difficult to maintain a schizophrenic decoupling between the organization’s
stated policies and its (actual) internal culture.23
But the ensemble structure of this new private order has another, more subtle effect.
There is positive feedback between the multi-focal invocation of the idea of sustainability
across the ensemble, the normative standing of the idea as a moral-political principle, and the
moral legitimacy of the ensemble and each of its constituent regimes. The mutual
engagement with the concept of sustainability through the distinct regime-spaces and the
normative cross-reference it facilitates is thus a source of positive normative externality.
The emergence of this kind of positive network externality is not a necessary consequence
of the evolution of PTER. The fact that these various schemes all operate within a common
subject-matter domain — environmental regulation — is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for the emergence of ensemble regulatory structure.24 I can offer two tentative
observations in this context. First, the idea of sustainable development provided the network
regimes with a focal ideological point, giving more room for cross-network collaboration.25 A
second point concerns the institutional characteristics of this regulatory ensemble. First, the
non-statal nature of the transnational institutions involved in this network has allowed them
to transcend the national frictions that tend to haunt treaty-based regimes.26 Second, the fact
that the distinct regimes composing the ensemble have evolved in a non-imperialistic fashion,
each capturing a different segment of the CSR universe, has reduced the competitive tensions
between the institutions, thereby facilitating the emergence of a synergic structure.
Unfolding the structure of the PTER field as a reflexive network requires further
theoretical and empirical work, but there are strong indications that this field has indeed
reached a structural tipping point, which changed its underlying dynamic.27

23.
24.

25.
26.

27.

See Oren Perez, Between Soft Law and Greenwash: The Compliance Dynamic of Civil Forms of
Environmental Regulation, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (D. Levi-Faur & Edward
Elgar ed., 2011).
A good counterexample is the field of international trade law, in which the proliferation of bilateral
free-trade treaties poses an increasing risk to the WTO multilateral framework. See Jayant Menon,
Dealing with the Proliferation of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, 32(10) WORLD ECONOMY 1381
(2009).
See Nils Ringe, Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal
Points, 49(4) AM. J. POL. SCI. 731 (2005).
For example of the frictions that underlie the trade and climate change regimes, see James Scott &
Rorden Wilkinson, What Happened to Doha in Geneva? Re-engineering the WTO's Image While
Missing Key Opportunities, 22 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 141 (2010); John Whalley & Sean Walsh, Bringing
the Copenhagen Global Climate Change Negotiations to Conclusion, 55(2) CESIFO ECON. STUD 255
(2009).
See Perez, supra note 22, at 548; KELSO, J.A. SCOTT & DAVID A. ENGSTROM, THE COMPLEMENTARY
NATURE 6-14 (The MIT Press, 2006); Andrew Pilny & Michelle Shumate, Hyperlinks as Extensions
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III. PTER In the "The Art and Craft of International Environmental
Law": Reflections and Critique
Bodansky recognizes the fact that private transnational regulation and private social
agents (businesses, NGOs, experts) are taking an important role in the contemporary global
governance system. However, his conceptual framework disregards the systemic aspects of
this process, leading him to understate the significance of this phenomenon. Already in the
preface to the book, Bodansky refers to private standards — "the sustainable fishery and
forestry standards used by Wal-Mart and Home Depot" which were developed "more
informally by environmental groups and business, and are applied to producers through
supply-chain contracts, without any government involvement" — as an example of
international environmental norm.28 He returns to this example later in the book when he
enumerates the norms of international environmental law. In addition to intergovernmental
agreements, decisions of treaty bodies, conference resolution and declarations, claims by
states, and writings of legal scholars and experts, he similarly refers to business codes and
conduct. The latter are defined as self-regulation efforts by business groups, sometimes in
conjunction with environmental groups. He gives the example of the Marine Stewardship
Council rules on sustainable fisheries (adopted by Wal-Mart). The development of these rules
can be associated, he writes, with several motives: a wish to forestall intergovernmental
regulation, reputation building or a genuine desire to improve the environment.29
What is the legal status of private transnational environmental norms, in comparison to
the classic instruments of public international law such as treaties or customary law?
Bodansky seems inclined to the view that they represent either non-legal norms or soft law,
given that "business codes of conduct are developed by non state actors, without any law
making authority."30 This statement is somewhat relaxed in the pages that follow. Bodansky
argues that what distinguishes hard law from soft law is the psychological state of mind of
the relevant community: "Ultimately what makes a norm 'hard' is not that violations can be
sanctioned, at least in the way that we ordinarily mean, or that norm can be applied by
courts. Instead, what matters is the state of mind of the actors that comprise the relevant
community – what we referred to earlier as the actor's internal point of view — a sense that
the norm represents an obligation and that compliance is therefore required rather than
optional."31 This definition seems to leave open the possibility that 'legal-like' private
instruments, which have the mandatory quality of legal statements,32 could constitute "law"
and lead to the emergence of legal communication. However, while Bodansky’s theoretical

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

292

of Offline Instrumental Collective Action, 15(2) INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 260 (2012).
BODANSKY, supra note 1.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 101.
Paul McNamara, Deontic Logic, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 103-04 (Edward N.
Zalta ed. Summer 2010), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/logicdeontic/ (discussing how the mandatory quality of legal statements reflects their adherence to the
deontic syntax, which is based on the following three basic forms: a prescriptive form (it is obligatory
that), permissive form (it is permissible that) or prohibitive form (it is impermissible that)).
Bodansky does not refer to literature of deontic logic).
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framework seems open to that possibility, he rejects that possibility as a practical matter, as
he states in various places that private regulatory instruments are "non-legal.” Indeed, in
footnote 52 he states generally that he uses the term soft law to refer only to non-legal
norms,33 and he later repeats that observation with reference to the specific example of ISO
14000 environmental management series.34
Despite the characterization of PTER as non-law Bodansky does not ignore the potential
contribution of private standards, and more importantly private agents, in the advancement
of environmental goals. He concludes chapter five (Varieties of Environmental Norms) by
stating that international lawyers "can even pursue norm-making activities outside the
intergovernmental process altogether, through private-standard setting. As a result, the
question “what is law?” though still a favorite, has lost its prominence."35
Bodansky provides further discussion of private players in chapter six (“Who's Who in the
Legal Process”) in which he devotes several pages to NGOs and Business parties.
International Environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace, WWF, FIELD, and World
Resources Institute, play an important role, Bodansky argues, by mobilizing public opinion,
by utilizing their expertise to advocate pro-environmental policies and by using their moral
authority and data-gathering capacities to condemn ecologically adverse activities using
blaming and shaming campaigns.36 Business, Bodansky argues, "contribute[s] significantly
both to the creation and to the solution of environmental problems."37 In the context of our
discussion of PTER, Bodansky notes that business groups participate directly in the
standard-setting process and provide crucial technical expertise.38 He notes other examples of
private standard-setting initiatives such as the Equator Principles (a framework for
addressing environmental and social risks in project financing currently adopted by 73
financial institutions) and the International Chamber of Commerce Business Charter for
Sustainable Development.39
Bodansky's approach to PTER seems lacking both in its conceptual structure and in its
empirical grounding. Conceptually, Bodansky's discussion of the role of private codes and
private agents seems incoherent. On the one hand he develops a psychological account of
legal validity that emphasizes the state of mind of the actors that comprise the relevant
community as the primary criterion for legal validity; on the other hand he seems committed
to the view that sees PTER schemes as non-law. One possible source for this inherent tension
in his account is an implicit commitment to a binary distinction between soft law and hard
law. Such commitment, however, disregards the possibility of conceptualising the idea of
normativity as a fuzzy predicate that may be realised in degrees.40 “Softness” under this
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 99.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 124-49.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 134; EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-principles.com; Policy and Business Practices,
INT’L CHAMBER OF COMM., http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/environment/id1309/index.html.
Perez, supra note 22; Oren Perez, Law as a Strange Loop, BAR ILAN UNIV. PUB LAW Working Paper
No. 01-10, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520969 (Dec. 9, 2009) in SOCIOLOGICAL
JURISPRUDENCE – LIBER AMICORUM GUNTHER TEUBNER (Gralf-Peter Calliess et al. eds., Gruyter,
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alternative conceptualisation does not designate a state of lawlessness, but a state of graded
normativity, with differing levels of normative force. This interpretation invites us to
understand normativity in terms of a continuum, which is closed by the ideal types of “nonlaw” and “crisp (or absolute) law". The notion of fuzzy legality stipulates a legal universe in
which legal norms do not possess the full force attributed to them in the ideal world of
absolute legality. From a classic jurisprudential perspective the key for understanding the
meaning of fuzzy legal norms lies in relaxing the assumption that legal norms provide
content-independent reason for action, which cannot, in particular, be defeated by non-legal
considerations. Relaxing this assumption would allow for the possibility that fuzzy norms
(unlike ideal-type, 'Razian' legal norms) could be defeated by (some) non-legal reasons.41
Empirically, Bodansky seems to underestimate the scope and scale of PTER as a social
phenomenon. While, as noted above, Bodansky certainly acknowledges this phenomenon, and
the role of private players in the international governance arena, he does not seem sensitive
enough to the structural transformation that took place within the PTER domain and the
enforcement and normative positive externalities associated with it.42 One reflection of this
neglect is the way in which Bodansky analyzes PTER conceptually — under the heading of
either NGOs or Business.43 This categorization disregards the institutional autonomy of
many of the standard-setting organizations or networks that are involved in the process and
the way they have created a new idiosyncratic field of action.44 This sociological neglect also
means that his discussion cannot fully capture the policy potential of PTER, both
independently and in connection with the more traditional instruments of international law.

IV. Concluding comments
The increasing importance of PTER in the governance of global environmental dilemmas
turns the question of the inter-linkages between the classic domain of public international
law and PTER into an important policy issue. Of particular importance is the following
question: to what extent do these two domains offer synergetic opportunities, or rather
generate conflicting processes which may undermine the overall goal of pushing the global
society into a more sustainable path? Consider for example the climate change domain.
Parallel to the climate change convention and the Kyoto Protocol, one can find a variety of
private mechanisms that regulate diverse aspects of the climate change problematic. The

41.

42.

43.
44.
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Berlin 2009).
Such possibility can be conceptualized with the theoretical tools of defeasible logic. See John L.
Pollock, Defeasible Reasoning with Variable Degrees of Justification, 133 (1-2) ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 233 (2001); Giovanni Sartor, Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning, EUR. UNIV. INST.
Working
Paper
No.
2009/02
(2009),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1367540.
Perez, supra note 22, at 549; Oren Perez, The New Universe of Green Finance: From SelfGovernance to Multi-Polar Governance, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS 151 (Olaf Dilling, Martin Herberg & Gerd Winter eds.,
Hart Publishing 2008).
BODANSKY, supra note 1, at 123, 130.
Dingwerth & Pattberg, supra note 12; Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the
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environmental chapter of the GRI Guidelines requires reporting corporations to disclose their
"total direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions by weight”.45. FTSE4Good Inclusion
Criteria were expanded in January 2008 to include climate change criteria, which require
firms in general to address their climate change impacts.46 Finally, the carbon offset market
includes, alongside the compliance mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (the Joint
Implementation and Clean Development Mechanisms),47 a variety of voluntary schemes, such
as WWF Gold Standard and the Voluntary Carbon Standard.48
Do these voluntary programs form a synergetic coupling with the climate change regime?
One can offer competing hypotheses in this context, and it is far from trivial how to determine
which is right empirically. The claim that there is strong potential synergy between the
regimes draws on the governance deficit of the climate change regime and international
environmental law in general (as discussed by Bodansky).49 PTER offers governance
flexibility that is not available within the classic treaty regime. While it is true that firms
cannot be compelled to join a particular PTER regime, once they enter into the voluntary
green club there are multiple institutional mechanisms through which the regime can foster
compliance, from disclosure to third-party verification and continuous engagement, drawing
on normative, institutional and market incentives.50 The thesis that there is a positive
complementarity between the public and private regimes is supported by various studies that
demonstrate the efficacy of these regimes.51 The counter thesis argues that the emergence of
PTER regimes should be understood as a strategic maneuver to counter more formal
collective action. Thus, according to this story, the existence of private climate change regimes
could support the opposition to the climate change negotiations. By creating a façade of
regulatory activity, these regimes may forestall more formal (and efficient) regulatory
intervention. While this story is not completely implausible, it seems to disregard the
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formidable obstacles for concluding and implementing environmental treaties (such as free
riding and lack of effective sanctioning) which Daniel Bodansky rightly points to.52
Further, the skeptic camp also disregards a further form of synergy between the fields — a
circular normative cross-support. The ensemble-like engagement with the climate change
problematic can facilitate social-wide concern for the climate change problematic and
legitimize further international action on this front. This could be particularly important as
negotiations on the future of the Kyoto Protocol continue even after the 2011 meeting in
Durban.
Overall, the parallel universes of environmental treaties and PTER regimes generate a
series of theoretical questions and practical challenges that clearly fall within the book’s main
project: the examination of the "processes by which international environmental law is
developed, implemented, and enforced."53 The fact that these questions are not resolved in
this book does not detract from its value — the book is a great piece of legal scholarship,
exposing the structural nuances of international environmental law in a theoretically
complex fashion. Rather this lacuna should be seen as an invitation for further scholarly
work on these cardinal questions.
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